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Abstract 
Black-box algorithms now account for nearly a third of all U. S. stock trades. It 
is a mistake to think that these algorithms possess superhuman intelligence. In 
reality, computers do not have the common sense and wisdom that humans 
have accumulated by living. Trading algorithms are particularly dangerous 
because they are so efficient at discovering statistical patterns—but so utterly 
useless in judging whether the discovered patterns are meaningful. 
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Be Wary of Black-Box Trading Algorithms 
 A computer algorithm is a specific sequence of steps for performing a task, such as finding a 
square root or spell-checking a word. There are many stock market trading algorithms, including 
programs that try to reduce the costs of executing trades or try to make a profit by arbitraging 
price discrepancies across different exchanges.  
 My focus is on trading algorithms that try to discover profitable statistical patterns, 
including timing trades (for example, stock prices usually go up after a surge in calm words on 
Twitter) and convergence trades (for example the term structures of German and French interest 
rates are related). These kinds of trading algorithms are typically black box in that, once the code 
is written, humans do not interfere with the algorithm or know why specific trades are made.  
 A 2017 hedge fund prospectus boasted that their “fully automated portfolio [is] run via 
computer algorithms…. All trading is conducted through complex computerized systems, 
eliminating any subjectivity of the manager” (RK Capital 2017). This was evidently thought to 
be a feature, not a flaw, because computers are smarter than humans. Many investors apparently 
agree. Black-box algorithms now account for nearly a third of all U. S. stock trades (Zuckerman 
and Hope 2017). 
 Computer “intelligence” is, in fact, very different from human intelligence. Trading 
algorithms do not understand the world in any meaningful sense, and are consequently risky 
because they are so efficient at discovering statistical patterns—but so utterly useless in judging 
whether the discovered patterns are consequential or coincidental. 
Introduction 
 The spread of the internet in the 1990s sparked the creation of thousands of internet-based 
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companies, popularly known as dot-coms. Some dot-coms had good business plans and became 
successful companies. Most did not. In too many cases, the idea was simply to start a company 
with a dot-com in its name, sell it, and walk away rich. Cooper, Orlin, and Rau (2001) found that, 
on average, companies that did nothing more than add .com, .net, or internet to their names 
nearly doubled the price of their stock. 
 The same thing is happening now with artificial intelligence (AI). In 2017 the Association of 
National Advertisers (2017) chose “AI” as the Marketing Word of the Year. AI has become 
fashionable in investing, too, with black-box trading algorithms promising more than can be 
delivered. A dot-com name does not guarantee success, nor does an AI label. 
Data Mining 
 In 2008, Chris Anderson, editor-in-chief of Wired, wrote an article with the provocative title, 
“The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete.” Anderson argued 
that, 
With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves…. Correlation supersedes 
causation, and science can advance even without coherent models, unified theories, or 
really any mechanistic explanation at all. 
This declaration seemed intentionally controversial at the time, but it was prescient, as many 
have abandoned the scientific method and come to believe that correlation supersedes causation. 
 The scientific method begins with a plausible theory and then collects appropriate data to test 
this hypothesis. The scientific method was the foundation for the triumph of science over 
superstition. Today, however, it has become fashionable to turn the scientific method on its head 
by scrutinizing available data “to reveal hidden patterns and secret correlations” (Sagiroglu and 
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Sinanc 2013). When a pattern is found, either make up a theory after the fact or assert that 
theories are unnecessary (Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro, and Smyth, 1996; Cios, Pedrycz, Witold, 
and Kurgan 2007; Begoli and Horsey, 2012). Some go so far as to argue that using expert 
knowledge of the phenomena being modeled is not only unnecessary, but limiting (Piatetsky-
Shapiro 1991). 
 After Pepperdine University invested 10% of its portfolio in quant funds in 2016, the director 
of investments argued that, “Finding a company with good prospects makes sense, since we look 
for undervalued things in our daily lives, but quant strategies have nothing to do with our 
lives.” (Zuckerman and Hope 2017) In truth, the absence of the wisdom and common sense 
acquired by being alive is an argument against algorithmic trading. 
 The now commonplace idea that analyses begin with data rather than expert opinion goes by 
a variety of names, including data mining, knowledge discovery, knowledge extraction, and 
information harvesting. The data are mined to discover theories, extract knowledge, and harvest 
information. Data mining is the cornerstone of black-box trading algorithms. 
 There was a time when data mining was considered a misdeed, akin to plagiarism. As Nobel 
Laureate Ronald Coase (1988) lamented decades ago: “If you torture the data long enough, it 
will confess.” His caustic comment is ignored today by people who don’t understand that those 
who ransack data looking for statistical patterns will surely find some—so, their discoveries 
demonstrate nothing more than that data were ransacked. 
 In the opening lines to a forward for a book on using data mining for knowledge discovery, a 
computer scientist (Kecman 2007) wrote, without evident irony,  
“If you torture the data long enough, [it] will confess,” said 1991 Nobel-winning 
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economist Ronald Coase. The statement is still true. However, achieving this lofty goal 
is not easy. First, “long enough” may, in practice, be “too long” in many applications 
and thus unacceptable. Second, to get “confession” from large data sets one needs to 
use state-of-the-art “torturing” tools. Third, Nature is very stubborn — not yielding 
easily or unwilling to reveal its secrets at all. 
Coase did not intend his comment to be a lofty goal worth seeking, but as a succinct criticism of 
the practice of pillaging data in search of statistical significance (Tullock 2001). 
 The perils of data mining are summarized by the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy. In one variant, 
an avowed marksman demonstrates his prowess by painting thousands of bullseyes on the side of 
a barn. After he fires his gun, he finds the bullseye he hit and paints over all the other bullseyes. 
Since he will surely hit one bullseye, this proves nothing at all. 
 In investing, this corresponds to testing a large number of theories and selectively reporting a 
small fraction of the results. For example, back before it went bankrupt, the L. F. Rothschild 
investment bank reported that during the preceding six Dragon years in the Chinese zodiac 
calendar, the U. S. stock market had gone up four times and down twice (Allan 1976). No doubt, 
the misguided analyst behind this nonsense looked at each of the 12 zodiac signs (rat, ox, tiger, 
and so on). One sign is bound to have the highest coincidental correlation with up-years in the 
stock market, and this is the sign that was reported. 
 In another example, Bolen, Mao, and Zeng (2011) reported that a data-mining analysis of 
nearly 10 million Twitter tweets during the period February to December 2008 found that an 
upswing in “calm” words was often followed an increase in the Dow Jones average up to six 
days later. 
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 These Texas Sharpshooters looked at seven different predictors: an assessment of positive 
versus negative moods and six mood states (calm, alert, sure, vital, kind, and happy) with, no 
doubt, considerable flexibility in assigning mood states to various tweets. Is nice a calm, kind, or 
happy word? Is yes! an alert, sure, or vital word? The researchers also considered several 
different days into the future for correlating with the Dow. Finally, why did they use data from 
February to December 2008? What happened to January? Why did a 2011 paper use 2008 data? 
Did the discovered patterns only exist during that peculiar period, with words, moods, and days 
that were selected after the data had been tortured? Even the lead author admitted that he had no 
explanation. 
 The second variation of the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy is when the inept marksman fires his 
gun at a blank wall, and then draws a bullseye around the bullet hole. Since there is always a 
bullet hole to draw a bullseye around, this, too, proves nothing at all. 
 In investing, this corresponds to rummaging around in stock market data with no clear 
purpose in mind, and discovering a pattern. This was probably the origin of the Super Bowl 
Stock Market Predictor (Koppett 1978), which claims that the stock market goes up in years 
when the team that wins the Super Bowl is in the National Football Conference (NFC) or is in 
the American Football Conference (AFC), but was once in National Football League (NFL). 
 The stock market has nothing to do with the outcome of a football game. The accuracy of the 
Super Bowl Indicator is an amusing coincidence bolstered by the fact that the stock market 
usually goes up and the NFC usually wins the Super Bowl. The correlation is made more 
impressive by the gimmick of counting the Pittsburgh Steelers, an AFC team, as an NFC team 
because Pittsburgh won the Super Bowl several times when the stock market went up. 
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 The irony is that Leonard Koppett, the man who created the Super Bowl Indicator intended it 
to be an amusing demonstration of the fact that correlation is not causation: 
What does all this mean? Absolutely nothing on any rational level—and that’s exactly 
the point. Just because two sets of numbers coincide in some way, don’t leap to the 
conclusion that one set “causes” the other.  (Koppett 1978) 
He was astonished when people took the Super Bowl Indicator seriously: “It’s a joke! I meant the 
whole thing as a satire on the fallibility of human statistical reasoning. It’s too stupid to 
believe.” (Zweig, 2011) Among the credulous were two finance professors who published an 
article in the Journal of Finance arguing that, “although the theoretical relationship connecting 
the Super Bowl and subsequent stock market movements is not obvious,” the statistical 
relationship was highly statistically significant and would have very profitable if followed by 
investors (Krueger and Kennedy 1990). Spoken like true data miners. 
 I was told recently that some otherwise sophisticated investors still believe in the Super Bowl 
Indicator. They are bullish on stocks in 2018 because an NFC team, the Philadelphia Eagles, won 
the Super Bowl. 
 People used to have to work hard to torture data in search of patterns. Now it is far too easy. 
Computer trading algorithms can search for as many patterns in a second as humans can in 
weeks, months, or even years. This is not useful progress. 
Real Intelligence 
 Computers have perfect memories and can input, process, and output enormous amounts of 
information at unfathomable speeds. These features allow computers to do truly superhuman 
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feats: to work tirelessly on assembly lines, solve complicated systems of mathematical equations, 
find detailed directions to bakeries in unfamiliar towns.  
 Computers can tell us the day of the week Abraham Lincoln was born, the capital of 
Bulgaria, and the last time Arsenal won the Premier League. Computers are also relentlessly 
consistent. Asked to calculate the square root of 76,073,284, a computer will give the correct 
answer (8,722) essentially immediately, every time it is asked. Ask any human who is not a math 
freak the same question, and the answer will be slow and unreliable. It is tempting to think that 
computers are smarter than humans because they do some very difficult tasks better than 
humans. 
 Some of the allure of algorithmic trading stems from the success of computer programs 
competing against humans in checkers, chess, Go, and other games. These computer programs 
perform narrowly defined tasks that have clear goals (in chess, checkmate the opponent) 
stunningly, but they don’t mimic human thinking, which involves a creative recognition of the 
underlying principles that lead to victory. Instead, game-playing algorithms are built to exploit a 
computer’s strengths—that computers can make calculations quickly, have an infallible memory, 
and obey rules flawlessly. 
 Despite their freakish, superhuman skill at board games, computer programs do not possess 
anything resembling human wisdom and common sense. These programs do not have the general 
intelligence needed to deal with unfamiliar circumstances, ill-defined situations, vague rules, and 
ambiguous, even contradictory, goals. Deciding whether to accept a job offer, who to marry, or 
which stock to buy is very different from recognizing that moving a bishop three spaces will 
checkmate an opponent—which is why it is perilous to trust computer programs we don’t 
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understand to make decisions for us, no matter how fast they calculate square roots or how well 
they do at board games. 
The Winograd Schema Challenge 
 The Achilles’ heel of black-box trading algorithms is that they do not know, in any 
consequential sense, what words mean; so, they cannot assess whether the patterns they find are 
real or spurious. Computer algorithms data mine spectacularly well, but have no real 
understanding of the results of their data mining. 
 One way to recognize the inadequacies of computer algorithms is to consider the challenges 
identified by Stanford computer science professor Terry Winograd (1972) that have come to be 
known as Winograd schemas. Here is an example from a collection compiled by Davis (2017), a 
computer science professor at New York University: 
I can’t cut that tree down with that axe; it is too [thick/small]. 
If the bracketed word is thick, then it refers to the tree; if the bracketed word is small, then it 
refers to the axe. These kind of sentences, with more than one noun and alternate words that 
identify which noun is being referenced by a pronoun, are understood immediately by humans 
but are very difficult for computers because computers do not have the real-world experience to 
place words in context. 
  When we see a tree, we know it is a tree. We might compare it to other trees and think about 
the similarities and differences between fruit trees and maple trees. We would not be surprised to 
see a squirrel run up a pine tree or a bird fly out of a dogwood tree. We might remember planting 
a tree and watching it grow year by year. We might remember cutting down a tree or watching a 
tree being cut down. 
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 A computer does none of this. For a computer, there is no significant difference between tree, 
tiger, and eg74w, other than the fact that they use different symbols. A computer can spellcheck 
the word tree, count the number of times the word tree is used in a story, and retrieve facts about 
trees, but computers do not understand what trees are in any relevant sense, and do not respond 
to the word tree or a picture of a tree the way humans do. 
 From their life experiences, humans know that it is hard to cut down a tree if the tree is thick 
or the axe is small. Computers struggle because they have no life experiences to recall. They do 
not really know what a tree is, or an axe, or what cutting down means. 
 There is a Winograd Schema Challenge with a $25,000 prize for a computer program that is 
90 percent accurate in interpreting Winograd schemas (Levesque, Davis, and Morgenstern  
2012). In the 2016 competition, the expected value of the score for guessing was 44 percent 
correct (some schemas had more than two possible answers). The highest computer score was 58 
percent correct, the lowest 32 percent, a variation that may have been due more to luck than to 
differences in the competing programs’ abilities. 
 If computers do not know what words mean, they cannot possibly evaluate the plausibility 
of discovered statistical patterns. 
Deep Neural Networks 
 Many computer programs now use deep neural networks (DNNs) that are inspired by the 
neurons in human brains. However, DNNs do not mimic human brains because we have barely 
scratched the surface in trying to figure out how human brains work. DNNs are more 
complicated and sound sexier than earlier algorithms, but they are still just computer programs 
that identify and manipulate patterns. 
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 DNNs have improved language translation, visual recognition, and other tasks, but they are 
still limited by the reality that, unlike human brains, computers do not truly understand words, 
images, life. For example, a language translation program that identifies key words and phrases 
in a sentence, finds matching words and phrases in another language, and puts the matches in a 
grammatically correct order is not reading or writing and it is not trying to convey meaning. That 
is why the results are sometimes perfect and, other times, astonishingly bad (Hofstadter 2018). 
 Similarly, visual-recognition algorithms are very granular, analyzing pixels instead of 
concepts, and the results are very brittle. Putting graffiti on a photograph of a stop sign or even 
changing a few pixels in a picture of a stop sign—alterations that would not be noticed by 
humans—can cause state-of-the-art DNNs to fail miserably (Evtimov, Eykholt, Fernandes, 
Kohno, et al. 2017; Su, Vargas, and Kouichi 2017). Mapping pixels is not the same as knowing 
what a stop sign is. 
 Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune (2015) demonstrated something even more surprising. In 
addition to making nothing out of something (like a computer not recognizing a stop sign), 
computers can make something out of nothing by misinterpreting meaningless images as real 
objects. For example, state-of-the-art DNNs misidentified a series of black and yellow lines as a 
school bus, completely ignoring the fact that there were no wheels, no door, and no windshield in 
the picture, because computer algorithms do not know in any relevant sense what a school bus is. 
  Sharif, Bhagavatula, Bauer, and Reiter (2016) reported that the state-of-the-art deep neural 
network programs used in facial biometric systems can be fooled by persons wearing colorful 
eyeglass frames. One of the authors, a white male, was misidentified as Milla Jovovich, a white 
female, 88 percent of the time, and another author, a 24-year-old Middle Eastern male, was 
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misidentified as Carson Daly, a 43-year-old white male, 100 percent of the time—all because the 
eyeglass frame colors led the computer program astray. Humans do not make such mistakes 
because we know what eyeglass frames are, and we know that we should look past the frames to 
identify the person we see. Computers know none of this; they just match pixels as best they can. 
A Knowledge Discovery 
 AI stock programs are susceptible to analogous mistakes because the algorithms do not 
understand in any real sense the data that they manipulate and torture. Numbers are just numbers 
and labels are just words. 
 To demonstrate this concretely, I analyzed daily observations on 100 potential explanatory 
variables in 2016 to see if a data-mining algorithm could uncover a simple model for predicting 
the level of the S&P 500 the next day. Considering all 100 possible explanatory variables, I used 
a multiple regression algorithm to estimate 9,900 models with two explanatory variables. 
 It would have taken me many months to estimate the parameters of these 9,900 models using 
a pencil and paper. It took my computer a few seconds. The best of these 9,900 estimated models 
used variables 58 and 94: 
P = 1,640.64+1.83X58 + 3.62X94 
The correlation between the predicted and actual values of the S&P in shown in Figure 1 is an 
impressive and highly statistically significant 0.93. I should evidently let my algorithm buy 




Figure 1 Some Knowledge Discovery For Stock Prices 
 What are these two predictors for the S&P 500? Suppose that they are the daily high 
temperature in Curtin, Australia, and the daily low temperature in Antelope, Montana. A human 
would know that this is nonsense. An algorithm would not. Humans know what stock prices and 
temperatures are. They know U. S. stocks are not made more or less valuable by the high or low 
temperatures in these two small cities, one of which is in Australia. An algorithm would not 
know this, because a computer cannot comprehend what these data are. 
 A computer does not know what a stock is. It could retrieve a definition of stock, though it 
might be a different kind of stock; perhaps merchandise, animals, or bouillon. Even if the 
computer program found the correct definition of stock, it would not know what the words in the 
definition mean, though it could retrieve definitions of these words, too, and then definitions of 
the words in those definitions. Beyond retrieving definitions, a computer does not know, in any 















know what the high and low temperatures in Curtin and Omak are or whether they might 
plausibly be related to U. S. stock prices. 
 A computer search for the words stock prices and Australian temperatures is unlikely to turn 
up anything that the computer would interpret as supporting or contradicting the statistical 
pattern it discovered, and, if it did find anything, the computer would be hard-pressed to assess 
the reliability of what it found. In addition, the whole claim of “knowledge discovery” is that 
computers will discover new, previously unknown patterns and relationships. By definition, a 
knowledge discovery is not something that has already been reported. How can a computer 
program that does not understand words tell whether its knowledge discovery makes sense? It 
cannot. 
 This trading model was selected after estimating 9,900 models with 2016 data and 
identifying the most accurate model. Because it was based on data, rather than logic, we 
shouldn’t expect it to work very well in predicting stock prices in 2017. Figure 2 shows that the 
accuracy in 2017 is –0.54. Yes, that is a negative sign. When the model predicted an uptick or 
downtick in stock prices, the opposite was likely to occur. 
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Figure 2 Coincidence, not Knowledge 
 What happened? How can a model work so well one year and so badly the next? That is the 
inescapable nature of data mining. Choosing a model simply because it fits a particular set of 
data closely virtually guarantees that it won’t do nearly as well with fresh data. For a model to 
work with fresh data, it needs a theoretical foundation. It has to make sense. Correlation does not 
supersede causation. 
 It might be tempting to think that perhaps this discovered statistical relationship between 
stock prices and temperatures in these two cities is real—that my algorithm discovered a 
previously unknown relationship. Anticipating such a temptation, I did not actually use daily 
temperatures or any other real variables. Each of the 100 candidate explanatory variables was a 
randomly generated variable that—because it random—is guaranteed to have no systematic 
relationship to the S&P 500. By chance alone, variables 58 and 94 happened to be statistically 















nothing at all to do with stock prices, but happened to have been temporarily correlated with 
them during the in-sample estimation period. 
 That is the point. Even though all the data were generated randomly and have nothing 
whatsoever to do with stock prices, my data-mining algorithm found some variables that were 
fortuitously correlated with the S&P 500. The trading rule uncovered by my data mining 
algorithm was not knowledge discovery. It was coincidence discovery. 
 The data analyzed by a trading algorithm might include some variables that really do matter; 
however, when an algorithm ransacks data looking for statistical relationships, the more 
variables it considers, the more likely it is that the variables it chooses are coincidental rather 
than causal (Calude and Longo 2016). 
Out-of-Sample Validation 
 Since a data-mined model’s weaknesses can be exposed by the deterioration of the model’s 
fit using fresh data, it is reasonable to hold out part of the available data for testing after the 
algorithm has identified a promising trading model. Data-mine part of the data for knowledge 
discovery and then validate the results by testing the discovered model with data that were set 
aside for this purpose (Mayers and Forgy 1963; Mark and Goldberg 2001). 
 It is always a good idea to test a model with fresh data. However, choosing a data-mined 
model via a repetitive cycle of in-sample estimation and out-of-sample testing does not ensure 
that a useful model will be chosen. Just as some models are certain to fit the in-sample data by 
luck alone, so some models are certain to fit both the in-sample and out-of-sample data. 
Uncovering a model that fits all the data is just another form of data mining, and doesn’t solve 
the fundamental problem, which is that models chosen to fit the data, either part of the data or all 
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of the data, cannot be expected to fit new data nearly as well. 
 To illustrate this point, Figure 3 shows the in-sample and out-of-sample fits for all 9,900 
models that use 2 of the 100 randomly generated variables. For the 2016 data used to estimate 
the models, the correlation between the predicted and actual values cannot be less than zero, 
because the best-fit model can always ignore the word variables completely and have a 
correlation of zero. The average correlation for the in-sample models was 0.73. 
!  
Figure 3 All 9,900 In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Correlations 
 For the 2017 out-of-sample data that were set aside to test the models, the correlation is 
equally likely to be positive or negative because the words are, after all, random numbers that 
have nothing at all to do with stock prices. We expect the average correlation to be close to zero. 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Nonetheless, some out-of-sample correlations were, by chance, strongly positive and others 
were strongly negative. Figure 3 shows that several models fit the in-sample data well and also 
do well out-of-sample, sometimes even better than in-sample. That is the nature of chance, and 
these are chance variables. 
 In-sample, where the models are fit to the data, 129 models have a correlation above 0.90. 
Out-of-sample, where the models are accurate only by chance, six of the models with 
correlations above 0.090 in-sample have even higher correlations out-of-sample. These six 
models pass the validation test with flying colors even though it was pure luck. They are still 
useless for predicting stock prices. If we didn't know better, we might think that we discovered 
something important. But, of course, we didn’t. All we really discovered is that it is always 
possible to find models that do well in-sample and out-of-sample, even if the data are just 
random noise. 
 Models should be tested with set-aside data, but set-aside data are not a cure for energetic 
data-miners. A trading algorithm would have no trouble finding a model that performs almost as 
well (or even better) out-of-sample as in-sample, even though the variable being predicted is 
only coincidentally related to the explanatory variables. A trading algorithm cannot evaluate the 
plausibility of a discovered pattern because it does not understand in any meaningful sense what 
the data are and whether they might reasonably be related to stock prices.  
Conclusion 
 Black-box trading algorithms are appealing because computers do so many things so well. 
However, the inarguable fact that computers do many difficult things much better than humans 
does not mean that computers are better investors. When it comes to investing, computers are 
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much more efficient than humans at using data-mining to discover patterns, but completely 
incapable of gauging whether the unearthed patterns are potentially useful, or are merely 
coincidental and therefore fleeting and useless. Only humans can make that assessment. 
 If a trading algorithm is hidden inside a black box, then no one—neither computers or 
humans—can tell if a discovered patterns is useful or useless. Precluding human judgment is a 
flaw, not a feature.  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